While much of the public and government bodies have been focused on state intervention in elections, in this engagement, the analyst identified several other categories of those who engage in coordinated, deceptive behavior designed to influence public sentiment.

These groups -- and the online properties used during the course of a campaign -- are not universally actionable, illegal, or even inappropriate, though they are often unsavory.

What is notable about the three categories outlined below is that they are neither bounded by national borders, nor to an electoral calendar. This behavior will continue as long as there are incentives, with relatively few downsides for those participating in this way.

The ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) was the victor in the EP election with 45.28% of the vote (27 seats out of 51), setting the stage for national elections this fall, despite the attempts of the opposition parties to reverse the march of Hungarian-style illiberalism in Poland. The European Coalition (Koalicja Europejska) came in second with 38.3%, a ten-point slide from the results they achieved in the 2014 election. The new coalition is comprised of five opposition parties including the Civic Platform, formerly led by European Council President Donald Tusk, and a group of leftist and rural politicians. The Social Democratic Wiosna party came in third, earning only 6.06% of the vote, with a smattering of other parties winning votes in the single digits. Voter turnout stood at 45.7%, a record high for a European election in Poland.

PiS framed the European campaign as a battle against "Western liberal ideals," which they claim threaten the traditional way of life in Poland, and compromise the preservation of family and Catholic values. Issues such as gay rights, the legacy of the Holocaust, the role of the Catholic Church in public life, as well as immigration concerns were some of the more prominent social issues debated during the election. Given the proximity to the Polish parliamentary election, national issues such as social spending, health care, and education reform were also debated.

The results can be interpreted as a vote of confidence in the current government's leadership, and could potentially be viewed as a precursor to the fall election. This is being seen as the most important election since 1989, as it could further establish and solidify Poland's populist and conservative trajectory for years to come. Under the nationalist leadership of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the government has eroded democratic rights, put the judiciary under political control, and turned the public media into a propaganda machine. PiS opponents say this is reminiscent of Poland's Communist past, and tout the enlistment of the Polish Catholic Church to back its identity politics, as well as a way to appeal to poorer rural voters, on social benefits.

Poland sent the highest number of politicians characterized as 'Euroskeptics' to Brussels in May, and is tied for third for their proportion of Eurosceptic MEPs. This contributes to the growing chorus of populists in Europe, who share the goal of decentralizing power, and returning it to EU member states, as well as set and impose far stricter limits on immigration.

We observed substantial anti-semitic content across several sites, many of which monetized.

Isolationist and anti-Europe trends may or may not be strictly organic and domestic in origin. Certainly, the campaigns have the marks of international efforts. Though some movements are quite open in their operation, it is likely that there are more surreptitious efforts. Ruch Narowody has built large audiences on social media, which they will use to drive traffic and monetize, which is worth watching.

Anti-semitism is a pervasive and growing problem in Poland , and this is reflected on the platform. We identified multiple videos expressing hostility to Jewish Holocaust survivers reclaiming their property in Poland.

We observed multiple videos expressing pointed hostility to vulnerable communities including LGBTQ, immigrant and Muslims. Several channels hosting such content have subscribers than mainstream news television channels.

The push and pull that leads extremist and ideologically marginal groups to seek online audiences may be a rational response to exclusion from television . For example, Koalicja (a coalition of right wing and ultranationalist political parties ) was mostly shunned in the mainstream media, but found substantial support online.

Marine Le Pen's far-right Rassemblement National (RN) benefited from a wave of nationalist sentiment to win the most votes in France's election to the EP with 23.31%. However, the margin of victory over the coalition led by President Emmanuel Macron's party was narrow, with the Renaissance list earning 22.41% of the vote. Macron won the French presidency in 2017 on a decidedly pro-European platform (a "Europe that protects") and made the EP vote a litmus test for both himself and pro-Europe popularity -- making this a particularly stinging loss for the French leader. The Greens managed a surprise third-place finish with 13.48% of the vote, led by Yannick Jadot, of the Europe Ecology (EELV).

The two parties dominating French politics for decades -- until the rise of Macron -- both polled in the single digits. Nicolas Sarkozy's European People's Party (Christian Democrats) picked up 8 seats, and Francois Hollande's Socialist Democrats (S&D) picked up 6. It should be noted, the 'yellow vest' candidates scored just 0.54% of the vote, below the Animalist party (against animal cruelty) which polled at 2.17%.

Le Pen and her coalition put immigration at the center of its campaign, which has served as a battleground election issue from the national election to the EP. Tension with France's Muslim population (the largest in western Europe) has risen in the largely secular country in the wake of terror attacks, and controversies over Islamic practices, such as the wearing of burkinis. Security was another major theme of the election, with questions about how the EU can protect citizens from a range of issues including globalization, tech giants, the US and China, or from further waves of immigration. Concerns around immigration policy, partly fueled by the anti-government protests, have resulted in riots, injury, and death, creating a broad sense of instability. In far-right circles, conspiracy theories purporting the Notre Dame fire was a terror-attack kept secret from the people.

Jordan Bardella, the lead candidate of RN, emerged as a new face of the far-right who will play a prominent role in Brussels. The 23-year-old from a poor suburb north of Paris, and a descendant of Italian immigrants is known for his slick soundbites and rousing rallies. The rebranding of the National Front last year served as a repositioning of the party, declaring itself the political home for salt-of-the-earth folk, rooted in French tradition, who love their country and want to protect it from meddling Brussels technocrats, and the growing fear that Muslim migrants will take French jobs, and sully French culture.

Le Pen no longer talks of leaving the Euro or quitting the EU, instead she is teaming up with Italy's far-right deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, to disrupt the EU bloc from within, along with like-minded colleagues in both Germany and Austria, as well as a myriad of smaller forces. Joined together by opposition to mass migration, hostility toward Islam, and a desire to transfer powers back to national governments, this new grouping will seek to radically alter the EU.

Two political consulting firms working within France on behalf of the National Front were uncovered: ******* and ******* . ********* is an Israeli firm with deep ties to the MoD and to former Ambassador ********. To our knowledge, they have done little to no work inside Israel. An associated firm, Timor Strategies previously worked in West Africa and Central America. *********, in association with Cambridge Analytica, created controversial and ethnically divisive campaigns in Kenya and elsewhere. They also have worked with the AfD and other populist and Eurosceptic parties within Europe.

Much of the potentially violative content we identified in France could be considered "historical revisionism." This included matters related to race, religion and European integration.

While not meeting the guidelines for misinformation, we found multiple videos that we would characterize as "conspiracy theories." For example, claims that Macron and his party are collaborating with LePen to serve Israel. The Notre Dame burning was a particular target. Videos variously asserted that Macron or Islamic terrorists were behind the event and that it was being covered up. Other theories included claims that gilets jaunes (yellow vests/jerseys are being run by Wikileaks, Russian or Islamic leaders have infiltrated the government, and general fear-mongering about Zionists efforts to seize global power.

While some videos go into more depth on the conspiracy than others, most deliver the information in a very clear and measured way, emulating 'informational' videos, or even news content.

Title: OFFICIEL - le MOSSAD (Démasqué) Fait Croire à un Attentat ISLAMISTE !! (rough translation: Mossad (revealed) makes us believe that an attacker is Islamic). This story is originally from 1980, when France agreed to sell the plans for a nuclear reactor to Iraq. The chief scientist arrived in Paris to ensure materials will be delivered according to plan, and he is murdered at his hotel. This video was published on Jun 23, 2019. Some translations of on-screen text throughout video: "They are muddying the tracks so that it looks like an Islamist attack." "For or against Halal lunchrooms in schools?" "Trump is a victim of the Politics imposed by Israel" "IRAN USA - Only Asselineau (leader of the Eurosceptic conservative UPR party in France; major misinfo campaign, his posters say things like "Europe or Jobs: you choose") denounces the fraud, proof."

CRIF:: The CRIF is the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France - the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France. But in scanning the content, videos found with the hashtag are often filled with discussions of conspiracy - describing the CRIF as tyrannous, and describing Macron as a "cute narcissistic pervert" and a puppet, as well as suggesting things like, the CRIF wants to "change the Koran".

Compared to other countries such as Austria, Italy or Estonia, where far-right and Eurosceptic parties have reached the Executive branch, most Spanish citizens voted for pro-European parties. The Socialist Party (PSOE) was the top vote-getter with 32.86% of the vote share. The European People's Party (PP) came in second at 20.15%, dropping from 16 to 12 MEPs, despite having previously held the highest number of MEPs of all Spanish parties. Ciudadanos (Citizens-Party of the Citizenry, former ALDE) came in third at 12.18%. The Vox party performed slightly below expectations at 6.21% and has managed to become the first far-right grouping to win more than a single seat in the Congress since Spain returned to democracy, after the death of General Franco in 1975. While Vox picked up seats in the EP, their representation within a greater EU context is less than their French neighbors such as Marine Le Pen, in France.

Turnout was 60.73%, up from 2014 at 46%. Participation was strong, which was partially attributed to the European vote coinciding with municipal elections and, in some cases, regional elections in Spain.

Until last year Vox was considered a fringe party, without enough support to win seats in the Spanish Congress. Through a surge in ultranationalist, and anti-migration agendas, Vox jumped from 0.2% of the vote in the 2016 general election, to 10.3%, and now have 24 members of parliament. They also made significant gains in the regional elections in December in Andalusia, winning 12 seats.

Spanish Socialists made gains in the three different elections, strengthening the hand of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez while forming a new government after April's national election, which his party won without enough of a margin to gain a parliamentary majority.

Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats (CDU) and their allied Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) managed to win a combined 28.7% of the vote, down seven points from the European Parliament election in 2014. This was their worst result in a nationwide election in their history. The big news out of the election was the doubling of support for the Greens who earned 20% of the vote. They overtook the governing partner Social Democrat (SDP) in the process, who dropped 11 points from 2014 for 15.6% of the vote in this election.

The success of the German Greens can be linked to the weakness of the governing coalition of the Christian and Social Democrats. Both parties struggled with image problems, partly connected to their leadership and their lack of youth engagement. A third of German voters under the age of 30 voted Green in the European elections. By comparison, 13% of the same age group voted for CDU and 10% for SDP.

The far-right part AfD won 11% of the vote, and in comparison to Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France or Matteo Salvini's League in Italy, this result is considered moderate showing. A late-breaking investigation revealed that AfD's social media presence (which dominated all political communication online) was fueled by a massive fraudulent network of accounts and coordination, which could have cut into their overall success.

While AfD lost a few percentage points compared to the national election, in two east German states AfD became the dominant party, and is well positioned for the upcoming local elections. In a country which has been generally supportive of the EU overall, and has provided strong leadership in shaping European governance, the gains of an extremist, anti-EU nationalist party raises concern.

The Green's tried to make the election about environmental protection, the climate emergency, and clean energy. They highlighted the Volkswagen scandal and made voters consider whether the philosophy of unlimited growth and endless use of natural resources should be questioned. Some analysts believe the Greens are the antithesis of the growing nationalism, EU skepticism and anti-migration sentiment promoted by the AfD.

Not only do EU citizens in Germany elect the highest number of MEPs (96 seats), German politicians have exerted significant influence on the EP. They currently (co-) preside over four out of eight EP groups – the European People's Party (EPP), the Socialist's Group (S&D), the Greens/EFA group and the European Left (GUE/NGL). German MEPs high on the list of the most influential EU parliamentarians, but whether this will continue is in question. Germany and France are locked in a power struggle over who will be the next European Commission's President, European Council's President, European Central Bank's President and the next High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

AfD benefited from a large scale, dense network of fake accounts on an external social platform. The construction of this network occurred over a number of years. During the election, it directed traffic to sites such as Journalalistenwatch.com. We were able to successfully resolve this to resources provided by non-state actors in the United States (in violation of German law), who funded agencies in the United States and a country in the Middle East.

There was a large, dense network of artificial Facebook accounts supporting the AfD. AfD represents 10-15 percent of the vote in Germany but controlled 85% of all shares on that network.

This content was not necessarily or even likely violative, so this was strictly speaking, out of scope for the engagement. Nonetheless, we briefed stakeholders about our findings because it demonstrated clear intent, and is a potential threat across the vulnerable products and conduct of elections.

We identified videos professing ultranationalist views and promoting hostility towards migrants. Certain groups were characterized as being "threats" to German culture, or burdens on the state. In particular, Islam was framed as an ideology rather than a religion, and a threat to the German way of life.

We identified videos using Nazi imagery, flags, symbols, and historical footage intermixed with commentary, current video, still photography of rallies, and music. Given German law, the content's availability in Germany possibly needs further examination.

While Pakistan and security issues drove much of the election narrative, there were and continue to be considerable challenges on many fronts for the country. Despite being a growing economic power, India still faces massive economic and social challenges -- with demands for education and health care services being primary among them. Unemployment is at levels not seen in 40 years, with nearly 20% of young Indians unable to find jobs. This is a continued challenge compounded by the fact that millions of Indians still live below the international poverty line, and lack basic necessities like clean drinking water. However, unpopular economic policies of Modi did not get in the way of another landslide victory for the Indian prime minister deflected by images of national resurgence and local development. In fact, he has effectively used religious identity and the concept of minorities as "others" to branded himself as a messiah and as a strong leader capable of change. His rhetoric has been focussed on a return to true hinduism and its roots as a way to return India to past greatness. Interesting to note the parallels with Trump's rhetoric in the US around immigration.

Issues that were secondary to terrorism and economic concerns included pollution, the security of women threatened by violence and rape, so-called fake news and ethnic and religious tensions. Modi's party has been seen as stoking anti-Muslim violence in India. His rhetoric has been focussed on a return to true hinduism and its roots as a way to return India to past greatness. Communal violence over the last five years has taken a huge toll on minorities, including Christians and Sikhs. But Muslims (15 percent of the country's population) have borne the brunt of these hate crimes, such as lynching, threats, attacks on places of worship and forced conversion.

Cheap smartphones and even cheaper mobile data was a major factor for the campaign and this election. Social media platforms like Facebook (300 M), Twitter (34 M) and Instagram (72 M), and messaging services like Whatsapp (200 M), were popular channels for exploitation by political parties and their backers online. Disinformation designed to benefit a particular party was pushed through these mediums in such considerable volumes, it was unfeasible for the India Election Commission, with just 300 people on staff, to moderate all of the content.

Many videos with high levels of engagement promoted divisive narratives between Hindus and Muslims. Many of the videos with divisive narratives were supportive of the BJP, and other Hindu nationalist parties, prior to the elections.

Muslims were often portrayed as not being 'true' Indians, and are often characterized as 'the enemy within'. Videos discuss proposals of a Muslim registry, the protection of cows against Muslim slaughter, warnings of problems when getting romantically involved with Muslims, and the suggestion of ethnic cleansing to rid the country of the perceived 'threat'.

Additionally, Ghazwa-e-Hind is often and repeatedly invoked as a battle against Hindu India from Muslim Pakistan, and while many use Hadith (oral traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad) to prophesies of a great battle in India between true and 'unbelievers' in an attempt to reinforce the idea of a Muslim or Pakistani threat to India.

Also worthy of note, many of the messages on Tube Sites delivered in Hindi, from those in any position of authority (such as an elected official), or of higher caste can appear to be directives, particularly when the messaging is characterizing another group of people as "the other".

As we saw in Poland, replacement language/words are used to discuss topics which might otherwise be flagged, to discuss anti-semitism such as: "Bade Bhai ka Kurta chote bhai ka pajama," meaning: shirt of older brother and trousers of a younger brother.

Russia continues to use disinformation as a weapon and foreign policy tool in Ukraine. Indeed, Ukraine is often a testing ground for new tactics and techniques .

The strong governmental response to fighting disinformation is on shaky ground under a new Presidential Administration whose posture around Russia is not clear.

An Israeli company ran an influence campaign aimed at disrupting elections in various countries, and its accounts were shut down.

Belorussian independence is back on the table as the government becomes more nervous about Russian involvement - the corollary is that Russia responds to criticism with talk of further integration/unification.

Russian encroachment into Belarusian civic and media space is increasing as well as pressure to enter a Customs Union at a moment when Belarus is asserting its national identity more officially.

Resistance to the Russian Customs Union has emboldened democratic and nationalist elements

Extensive anti-semitic content is an increasingly critical part of the disinformation and polarization of politics in Poland.

Russia's weaponization of information has disrupted political processes in the West as well as in countries more directly in their sphere of influence, especially where democratic values have taken hold. Policymakers have only recently started to focus on crafting strategies that address Russian digital manipulations and invest in strategic communications aimed at countering Russian disinformation in Georgia. Critical information is missing about how digital disinformation is working, with enough detail to target interventions. While there is a great amount of content analysis (outlined below), the typology of disinformation tactics, sources and funding connected to falsely promoted content is missing.

Recent violent protests were triggered by an Orthodox Russian delegation visit and a series of provocative actions.

Citizen concerns had been building over the current government engagement with Russia on soft power issues like the administrative boundary lines and kidnapping of Georgian citizens.

In order to distract of Russian investment (often real estate), there is negative messaging to "Turks" who are visibly investing in the Batumi region and "Muslim" investment in the capital, Tbilisi.

Gay pride events triggered vigilante groups who threatened violence and a government response that was luke-warm regarding the threats.

Like many countries around the world where fissures exist which only need a spark to set off protest or violence, recent events in Georgia have been simmering under the surface for some time. The recent ongoing protests were sparked by an Orthodox Russian delegation visit, and a series of provocative actions while in the country. The most recent protests, however, are larger than these issues alone.

Many Georgians feel the government is heavy-handed at home, but receptive to Russia's soft power even while they occupy 20% of the country's territory. The current government, led by the Georgia Dream party, has reinstated trade of agricultural products, increased Russian tourism, and Russian investment, often in real estate. Less reported in the media, but equally as concerning were the government's engagement with Russia on the administrative boundary lines and kidnapping of Georgian citizens there.

Overtures have been made to Russia by avoiding commenting on critical events in Ukraine of Russian interference and allowing politically legitimized pro-Russian political parties in Georgia to develop. It is impossible to understand the great outpouring of Georgian sentiment without understanding the pillars of the Kremlin's operations in Georgia.

The first is occupation and why they are doing it. Russia isn't occupying Crimea, or Abkhazia, or South Ossetia or Transnistria because they want the land, responsibility, or even to actually legally annex these countries. It simply wants to use those occupations to keep Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova unstable. They know that if those countries control their own borders they would soon become successful members of NATO, the EU, and the West.

Challenges to European aspirations; anti-EU and disparage the values-- democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.

Another push is the promotion of division. The Kremlin supports any person or entity to divide its targets through corrupt journalists, politicians, clergy to instill confusion, fear and hatred among the population by propagating conspiracy theories, half-truths or false information. This is often to create a sense among "us" of victimhood.

Another angle for the Kremlin is the promotion of financial benefits. They want corrupt leaders, inside deals, shell companies, offshore cash, and opaque transactions.

Negative attitudes towards Georgia's strategic partners – most notably the United States with only geopolitical interests in Georgia, and Turkey as a threat and an appropriator of Georgian territories.

Russia calls Georgia a western puppet state with a "Russophobic provocation," and canceled all flights to Georgia to "ensure Russia's national security and protect Russian nationals from criminal and other unlawful activities." The practical result is to hit the country's booming tourism industry, which attracted a million Russian visitors last year.

A recent study by USAID/ Caucasus Research Resource Centers-Georgia showed that the most influenced by propaganda include:

A third of the elderly over 65 are influenced, but only 20% of 18-24-year-olds are at risk of being influenced by anti-Western propaganda.

Roughly 20% in ethnic Georgian settlements are at-risk of being influenced by anti-Western propaganda, a third are in predominantly minority areas where other languages are spoken and there are fewer media channels.

Less education is also an indicator.